APM Terminals Archieven

MSC buys Bolloré Africa

Posted on april 1, 2022Leave a comment

€ 5.7 billion is the MSC bid for 100% of Bolloré Africa Logistics which has now been accepted. It covers all transport and logistics activities in Africa.

The Swiss-Italian – Aponte family group got access to the data room and started audits and contractual negotiations. Employee representatives of both groups have also agreed after successful negotiations with employees. So both groups reached an agreement on the acquisition based on a net value of the minority interests of EUR 5.7 billion.

The acquisition is still subject to approval by the relevant competition authorities and the agreement of some of Bollore Africa Logistics counterparties which are expected to be finalised within 12 months.

Bollore Africa Logistics is present in 42 ports and manages 16 container terminal concessions in 8 West-African ports. The group also owns three rail concessions in Africa, namely Sitarail, Camrail and Benirail whereby landlocked countries are connceted to ocean ports.

This network will be in the hands of MSC, which will become the largest transport and logistics operator in Africa adding terminals in Togo and Ivory Coast with TIL (Terminal Investment Group.)

So far, so…….. How does this re-desings the West-African shipping, ports and logistics lanscape ? Lets analyse the West-African tango of the two largest container liner operators and add APM Terminals-Maersk to the picture. APMT has terminals in Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Côte’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. Lets add Bollore’s – read now MSC’s – 16 container terminal concessions in, among others, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, Togo and Guinea-Conakry, 7 ro-ro terminals, 2 timber terminals. With TIL MSC had already a presence in Togo and San Pedro. Maersk and MSC have share-swaps in a.o. Guinee-Conakry and Liberie-Monrovia. In several other ports they are in JVC’s with Bollore – now MSC. When adding-up, more than 60% of the West_African container handling capacity on Africa’s westcoast is in hands of only 2 operators – MSC and Maersk.

If such a move would occure in Europe or the USA we would see red-lights flashing with the EU & US antitrust authorities. Not in Africa (yet).

Already for some time we see a considerable difference in handling cost in West-Africa ports which is min/max Usd 100/320 compared to the rest of the world Usd 80/155. Offcourse labourcost in Africa is also about double – right ? Or is the other way around ? On the inland logistics side related to landlocked countries we see an import container from Tema (Ghana) to Ouagadougou (Burkina-Faso) taking abt. 13-22 days at cost of Usd 4,800.- while the same move from Newark to Chicago takes 5 days and cost Usd 654.- Export containers move slightly faster and cheaper. How will MSC develop the Railproject Abidjan – Cotonou ? Will MSC – Maersk allow competition or “adjust” their pricing policies to meet their economic objectives ?

And what will be the herritage of Vincent Bollore’s activities in West-African ports.
SPECIAL REPORT: How Vincent Bolloré won control of Ghana’s biggest port | Article | Africa Confidential (africa-confidential.com) And that is only Ghana. He already settled the Togo case for Euro 12 millions. Will MSC be able to trace all the historical hidden “arrangements” made by Bollore – if there are any.

Is it all bad news – well its news and every downside has also an upside. Lets look to the study made by the CSIS – Centre for Strategic International Studies.
190604_AfricaPorts.pdf (csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com) . Can MSC – Maersk be a counterbalance against the strangling port financing, investment and construction heists ?

West-Africa remains a Political unstable region where key factors for top-decision makers are a fast payback and a good and steady return on investment. You never know which military boys band sings next and where you will end-up. Best example is the Necotrans experience in Conakry and how it ended when a new president handed-over the port concession manu-military to Bollore. The rest was for his Turkish friend Erdogan. Lets see how Special forces commander Mamady Doumbouya will react to the MSC take-over.

To be Continued…….

Port of Antwerp is looking for a solution for long waiting times on inland waterways – REALY??

Posted on maart 4, 2020Leave a comment

The inland navigation congestion problem in Antwerp and Rotterdam is not new, the only thing that has changed is the length of the delays. The problem is also not solved because all stakeholders – with the exception of the Port Authority – have no intention of committing to fundamental and structural solutions. The Municipal Port Authority has fulfilled its role as Public Authority to the maximum. BTS, Consolidation Hubs with subsidies and bringing parties around the table have been successful to a certain extent. It plays its role as facilitator but can do little else, although…. As far as the other stakeholders – read shipping companies and terminals – are concerned, it is a different story. To quote one of the inland navigation ship owners involved: “They don’t give a fu…”.

The expertise office SEASC4U delivered a study in April 2014 in which facts and figures were presented, conclusions and recommendations were made. The study was delivered to the CEOs of the Terminals MPET, DP World, PSA, APM Terminals, ECT and the Rotterdam and Antwerp Port Authorities, the shipowners CMA-CGM, Maersk and MSC and for the inland shipping sector to ICBO. She was Pro-Bono.

Nothing, I repeat, nothing of the conclusions and recommendations was withheld.

The Municipal Port Authority

8/10. With the 5 action points the Port Authority has facilitated solutions within its powers and possibilities. Nevertheless, BTS, among other things, must be able to do better, but the commitment of the stakeholders is low. What can the Port Authority enforce? Digitising and NxtPort’s commitment is promising, but again it depends on the stakeholders. Bundling via consolidation hubs has been introduced but the question is whether it will be sufficient and whether it will continue when the subsidies disappear. CEPA has finally woken up after the debacles of recent years – especially during the summer months – and is working hard on the dock workers quota. July and August are the litmus test. Construction of Dedicated Berths ?????? I’ll get back to it at The Terminals.

ICBO

?? Very active (sic.) My apologies to the well-meaning directors, but if the last “newsletter” is dated 25 November 2017, we can’t really speak of “playing short on the ball”. If we go over the membership file, I’ll refer you to De Barge Operatoren. If the members – perhaps with a few exceptions – are neither interested nor interested in improving the situation, another zillion declarations of intent can be officially signed and published, but then it remains dead letter.

The Barge Operators

The inland navigation sector is still one of the most fragmented in Europe. If we take a look at the members of ICBO – which is quite representative – we see that almost all of these operators are also Inland Terminal operators. This gives them a firm grip on the intermodal chain. It is not the congestion in the ports that is their problem – they recover it by means of a congestion surcharge on the goods. For them, the real problem is the modal shift that causes the congestion and the effect on the load factor of the ships. Many goods can’t wait 3 days with the risk of missing the connection to the seagoing vessel. With imports it is a little less sensitive but the goods will still choose to transport their containers by road. The Barge Operators shift the soot to the Terminals.

The Shipowners

It’s not their problem. (sic.) They’ve dumped a significant number of their 20,000 TEUs and then leave it on the land side to pursue their plan. They don’t like working together or consolidating because “the competition today is more on land than at sea”. Proposals to jointly develop an EBS (European Barge Shuttle – copy / paste ERS – European Rail Shuttle) concept and take control over the E2E chain is also not interesting – too many resources and too little return. Shipowners turn their backs on this fact and refuse to take responsibility. So much for their commitment to a sustainable transport chain.

The Terminals

Not much has changed since 2014. Let other stakeholders take the hot bricks out of the fire. The consolidation hubs meet the sub-optimal use of resources at the terminals and reduce the number of calls, which improves quay occupancy. This means a profit for the Terminals. On the basis of figures, it became clear that one particular terminal needed 3 permanent quayside capacity totalling 400 metres, exclusively dedicated to inland navigation. At other terminals the need for dedicated barge quay capacity was comparable. Almost nothing has changed since 2014 and investments in sufficient adapted quay capacity are zero.

The same study refers to the EBS (European Barge Shuttle) concept. The Terminals are “The Spider in the Web” and are in the best position to take E2E control over the containers they handle. By linking the container from on-board stowage to a stacking point at an inland terminal, they can optimise their operations in both seaports and inland ports through their own process control. Not only do they have to invest in inland facilities, but they also have to be prepared to set aside their local seaport egos and seek cooperation. EBS is a purchasing process and does not interfere with the sales process in which the individual terminals remain commercially independent, but through cooperation they expand their margins without penalising the customers/users. It also enables them to be less dependent on market monopolizing inland waterway operators.

Conclusion

I repeat the conclusions shared with all stakeholders in April 2014:

“Only if we keep an open mind and focus on the really important objectives of developing our multimodal and logistics activities in a sustainable way with empathy for future generations, will we be able to keep the engine oiled and moving. The transport target of 45% per Barge by 2035 is a less than ambitious target – we can and must do better and achieve it much sooner. The transport of goods by inland waterways is a key factor for the possible solutions, seeing that the current infrastructure of canals and rivers, on the one hand, and the carrying capacity of inland vessels, on the other hand, offer every opportunity to achieve the objectives of current and future sustainable logistics solutions. A 4P platform that balances People, Profit. Partnerships and Planet forms a solid basis for such developments. This study makes a modest contribution”.

They still haven’t understood.

Haven Antwerpen zoekt oplossing voor lange wachttijden binnenvaart – ECHT?

Posted on maart 4, 2020Leave a comment

Het lange wachttijden probleem is niet nieuw, het enige dat veranderd is de duurtijd van de vertragingen. Het probleem wordt ook niet opgelost omdat alle stakeholders – met uitzondering van het Havenbedrijf – niet de intentie hebben zich te engageren tot fundamentele en structurele oplossingen. Het Gemeentelijk Havenbedrijf heeft haar rol als Publieke Autoriteit maximaal ingevuld. BTS, Consolidatie Hub’s met subsidies en partijen rond de tafel brengen zijn tot op zeker hoogte succesvol. Zij speelt haar rol als facilitator maar kan verder weinig doen, alhoewel…. Wat de andere stakeholders – lees rederijen en terminals – betreft is het een ander verhaal. Om één van de betrokken binnenvaart scheepseigenaars te citeren: “Het interesseert ze geen fu…”

Het expertise kantoor SEASC4U leverde in April 2014 een studie af waarin met feiten en cijfers de stand van zaken werd weergegeven, maakte conclusies en aanbevelingen. De studie werd afgeleverd aan de CEO’s van de Terminals MPET, DP World, PSA, APM Terminals, ECT en het Rotterdams en Antwerps Havenbedrijf, de reders CMA-CGM, Maersk en MSC en voor de binnenvaartsector aan ICBO. Ze was Pro-Bono.

Niets, ik herhaal, niets van de conclusies en aanbevelingen werd weerhouden.

Het Gemeentelijk Havenbedrijf

8/10. Met de 5 actiepunten heeft het Havenbedrijf binnen haar bevoegdheden en mogelijkheden oplossingen gefaciliteerd. Toch moet o.a. BTS beter kunnen maar het engagement van de stakeholders staat op een laag pitje. Wat kan het GHA afdwingen? Digitaliseren en het engagement van NxtPort is veelbelovend maar is ook hier weer afhankelijk van de stakeholders. Bundeling via consolidatiehubs is ingevoerd maar de vraag is of het voldoende is en of het blijft duren wanneer de subsidies wegvallen. CEPA is na de debacles van de laatste jaren – en dan vooral in de zomermaanden – eindelijk wakker geschoten en werkt hard aan het Havenarbeiders contingent. Juli en Augustus zijn de lakmoesproef. Aanleg van Dedicated Ligplaatsen ????? Ik kom er op terug bij De Terminals.

ICBO

?? Heel actief (sic.) Mijn verontschuldigingen aan de wel bedoelende bestuurders, maar als de laatste “nieuwsbrief” dateert van 25 november 2017 kunnen we niet echt spreken van “kort op de bal spelen”. Als we het ledenbestand overlopen dan verwijs ik naar De Barge Operatoren. Als de leden – misschien op een enkele uitzondering na – geen interesse noch belang hebben bij een verbetering van de situatie, dan kan men nog een zillion Intentieverklaringen officieel tekenen en publiceren, maar dan blijft het dode letter.

De Barge Operatoren

Nog steeds is de binnenvaart sector één van de meest gefragmenteerde van Europa. Als we de leden van ICBO overlopen – en die is best wel representatief – dan zien we dat die operatoren bijna allemaal ook Inland Terminal operatoren zijn. Daarmee hebben ze een stevige greep op de intermodale keten. Niet de congestie in de havens is hun probleem – die verhalen ze door middel van een congestietoeslag op de goederen. Het echte probleem is voor hen de modal shift welke die congestie veroorzaakt en het effect op de beladingsgraad van de schepen. Veel goederen kunnen geen 3 dagen wachten met risico dat ze de aansluiting aan het zeeschip missen. Bij import ligt het iets minder gevoelig maar de goederen gaan toch kiezen om hun containers via de weg te vervoeren. De Barge Operatoren schuiven de roetpiet door naar de Terminals.

De Reders

Het is niet hun probleem (sic.). Ze hebben een aanzienlijk deel van hun 20.000 TEU in de haven gedumpt en laten het dan over aan de landzijde om er verder hun plan mee te trekken. Samenwerken of consolideren zien ze ook al niet zitten omdat “de concurrentie zich vandaag meer op het land dan op zee” afspeelt. Voorstellen om gezamenlijk een EBS (European Barge Shuttle – copy / paste ERS – European Rail Shuttle) concept uit te werken en controle te nemen over de keten is ook al niet interessant – te veel resources en te weinig return. De Reders keren het gegeven de rug toe en weigeren verantwoordelijkheid te nemen. Tot zover hun engagement naar een duurzame transportketen.

De Terminals

Er is sinds 2014 niet veel veranderd. Laat andere stakeholders maar de hete kolen uit het vuur halen. De consolidatiehubs komen tegemoet aan de suboptimale inzet van resources op de terminals en verminderd het aantal aanlopen waardoor de kadebezetting verbeterd. Winst dus voor de Terminals. Aan de hand van cijfers werd duidelijk dat één bepaalde terminal nood had aan 3 permanente en exclusief aan binnenvaart toegewijde kade capaciteit van totaal 400 meter. Op andere terminals was de nood aan toegewijde binnenvaartkade capaciteit vergelijkbaar. Er is sinds 2014 quasi niets veranderd en investeringen in voldoende aangepaste binnenvaart kade capaciteit is zero.

In dezelfde studie wordt verwezen naar het EBS (European Barge Shuttle) concept. De Terminals zijn “The Spider in the Web” en bevinden zich in de beste positie om E2E controle te nemen over de containers welke ze behandelen. Door de container vanaf aan boord stuwage te koppelen aan een stackplaats op een binnenlandse terminal kunnen ze door eigen procescontrole hun operaties in zowel de zeehavens als de binnenhavens optimaliseren. Daarvoor moeten ze niet enkel investeren in binnenlandse faciliteiten maar ook bereid zijn hun lokale zeehaven ego’s opzij te zetten en samenwerking te zoeken. EBS is een inkoopproces en raakt niet aan het verkoopproces waarbij de individuele terminals commercieel onafhankelijk blijven maar door samenwerking hun marges verruimen zonder de klanten / gebruikers te penaliseren. Het stelt hen ook in staat minder afhankelijk te zijn van markt monopoliserende binnenvaart operatoren.

Conclusie

Ik herhaal de conclusies welke in April 2014 met alle belanghebbenden werd gedeeld:

“Alleen als we een open geest houden en ons richten op de werkelijk belangrijke doelstellingen om onze multimodale en logistieke activiteiten op een duurzame manier te ontwikkelen met empathie voor toekomstige generaties, zullen we in staat zijn om de motor geolied en in beweging te houden. Het transport van 45% per Barge in 2035 is een minder dan ambitieuze doelstelling – we kunnen en moeten het beter doen en deze doelstelling veel eerder bereiken. Het vervoer van goederen over de binnenwateren is een sleutelfactor voor de mogelijke oplossingen, waarbij we zien dat de huidige infrastructuur van kanalen en rivieren enerzijds en het laadvermogen van de binnenschepen anderzijds alle mogelijkheden bieden om de doelstellingen van de huidige en toekomstige duurzame logistieke oplossingen te bereiken. Een platform dat People, Profit en Planet in evenwicht brengt, vormt een solide basis voor dergelijke ontwikkelingen. Deze studie levert een bescheiden bijdrage.”

Ze hebben het nog altijd niet begrepen.

A.P.Moller-Maersk to accelerate growth in logistics & Services through further integration

Posted on mei 16, 2019Leave a comment

Back to the Future !! It feels SO GOOD to see Maersk returning to the visionary and innovative strategy implemented by Flemming Jacobs in 1990 and initiated by yours truly by letting the Line take control over synchromodal operations by creating Maersk Intermodal Europe – MIE in Antwerp under the Maersk Group Services umbrella. Inland Navigation services and ERS – European Rail Shuttle and later ERS Railways moving over 70 dedicated Maersk trains per week to all corners of the European continent.

Was it a smart move after the Sealand acquisition to set-up a separate business unit for Terminals? Yes as transparency over terminal operations was close to non-existing. Was the next move by creating APM Terminals as independent Terminal Operating Company the right decision? Maybe as it surely optimised asset utilisation on Terminals by also accepting other container carriers. Was transferring “Inland Services” from the operation centres to APM Terminals a good move? Absolutely not. They had no clue what to do with it, they wanted to only focus on their so-called “core business” and started selling-off all these land-based activities. Sell ERS Railways, sell inland terminals such as Neuss, sell trucking companies etc… And now back to the future.

Yet one can wonder why in this direction and not using the Terminals as spider in the web. There is one straight line between one port and another port and today the Big-5 can hardly differentiate on the ocean product which is why they slot-swap and operate in VCA’s. Terminals are expensive assets and need to be able to minimise their CAPEX in order to optimise the product they treat. Why have Terminals not developed in inland gate and storage facilities – so called “extended gate” and take control over their “stacking area’s” on inland facilities. Why did terminals not enter into synchromodal product development offering their customers optimised flows neutralising the 22,000 TEU nightmares. Is this again a missed opportunity for the Terminals to secure customer bonding? Time will tell and see you on the next move.